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Abstract—A secure downlink transmission system which is ex-
posed to multiple eavesdroppers and is appropriate for Internet of
Things (IoT) applications is considered. A worst case scenario is
assumed, in the sense that, in order to enhance their interception
ability all eavesdroppers are located close to each other, near the
controller and collude to form joint receive beamforming. For
such a system, a novel cooperative non-orthogonal multiple access
(NOMA) secure transmission scheme for which an IoT device
with a stronger channel condition acts as an energy harvesting re-
lay in order to assist a second IoT device operating under weaker
channel conditions, is proposed and its performance is analyzed
and evaluated. A secrecy sum rate (SSR) maximization problem
is formulated and solved under three constraints: i) Transmit
power; ii) Successive interference cancellation; iii) Quality of
Service. By considering both passive and active eavesdroppers
scenarios, two optimization schemes are proposed to improve
the overall system SSR. On the one hand, for the passive eaves-
dropper scenario, an artificial noise-aided secure beamforming
scheme is proposed. Since this optimization problem is non-
convex, instead of using traditional but highly complex, brute-
force two-dimensional search, it is conveniently transformed into
a convex one by using an epigraph reformulation. On the other
hand, for the active multi-antennas eavesdroppers’ scenario, the
orthogonal-projection-based beamforming scheme is considered,
and by employing the successive convex approximation method,
a suboptimal solution is proposed. Furthermore, since for single
antenna transmission the orthogonal-projection-based scheme
may not be applicable a simple power control scheme is proposed.
Various performance evaluation results obtained by means of
computer simulations have verified that the proposed schemes
outperform other benchmark schemes in terms of SSR perfor-
mance.
Index Terms—Internet of Things (IoT), secure beamforming,
artificial noise (AN), orthogonal projection, secrecy sum rate
(SSR).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly evolving as a
complex platform connecting a very large number of com-
munication devices, e.g. sensors, controllers and actuators
[1]. However, achieving the required ubiquitous connectivity
required for such IoT based communication systems becomes
a vital and challenging task mainly because of the constraint
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of scarce bandwidth. In this context, nonorthogonal multiple
access (NOMA) is advocated as a promising technique to
support pervasive connectivity, so that the spectral efficiency
of IoT systems can be significantly enhanced [2]–[6]. The
key feature of NOMA is to implement the multiple access
(MA) in the power domain while the time/frequency/code
resources can simultaneously be shared by all users. More-
over, as compared to orthogonal MA (OMA), NOMA can
achieve a better balance between sum rate and user fairness
[7]. At the same time, as the wireless broadcast nature of
radio propagation makes IoT communications susceptible to
eavesdropping attacks, their security aspects need to be very
carefully considered when designing such systems. In the
past, conventional encryption techniques have been applied
to prevent eavesdroppers from recovering the secret messages
[8], [9]. However, such encryption-based techniques have
inherent difficulties and vulnerabilities dealing with secret key
management [1]. Fortunately, physical layer security (PLS) has
shown a great deal of potential to more accurately distinguish
the signals belonging to the legitimate receiver or the eaves-
dropper [10]–[12]. Unlike other encryption-based techniques,
PLS techniques take advantage of the physical characteristics
of wireless medium to ensure information-theoretic security
independent of the eavesdropper’s computing capabilities [13],
[14].
A. Motivation and Contributions
In the past, several PLS techniques based on the OMA
secure transmission protocol, including multi-antennas tech-
niques [15], [16], artificial noise (AN) [17]–[23] and coop-
erative jamming (CJ) [24]–[26] have been proposed. Aim-
ing to further improve the secrecy of the fifth generation
(5G) systems, Tian et al. [2] combined NOMA with multi-
antennas techniques to optimize the secrecy sum rate (SSR) of
5G wireless system for applications where the channel state
information (CSI) of eavesdroppers is available. In another
approach, Hu et al. [1] have combined the AN assisted multi-
antennas transmission technique with CJ in order to reduce the
effects of the passive non-colluding eavesdroppers for the IoT
downlink. However, since many IoT device transmitters have
limited radio frequency (RF) power, allocating some power
for AN or jamming signal may not be appropriate since this
will restrict the coverage range of secure transmissions.
In order to fill this gap, in this paper a novel relay-assisted
secure transmission scheme is proposed designed for energy-
constrained IoT based communication systems, where one
2controller emits secret messages to two classes of devices
operating in the presence of multiple colluding eavesdroppers.
These IoT devices have diversified quality of service (QoS)
requirements, and the channel conditions among them are
quite different in the sense that the channel operating con-
ditions for D1 are much better then the channel conditions
for D2. In order to guarantee the confidentiality of data
transmission and the QoS requirement of D2, D1 acts as an
energy harvesting (EH) relay to help D2. Assuming that the
locations of all eavesdroppers are close to the controller, this
worst-case positioning scheme will increase the probability
of interception of the information signal. For this energy-
constraint IoT system, a novel secure cooperative transmission
scheme is proposed and its performance is analyzed and
evaluated. Assuming that the CSI of the eavesdroppers is
available, two operational scenarios are considered, namely
the passive eavesdroppers and active eavesdroppers scenarios,
for which two optimization. For maximizing the SSR of the
IoT system under consideration under transmit power, QoS and
successive interference cancellation (SIC) constraints. Within
this framework, the primary contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
• A cooperative simultaneous wireless information and
power transfer (SWIPT) secure transmission protocol
which takes into account the diversified QoS require-
ments of different IoT users, is proposed. Unlike secure
transmission designs without SWIPT [1], [2], by em-
ploying the SWIPT-aided transmission protocol, device 1
forwards the information bearing signal and AN without
introducing additional energy consumption.
• For the passive eavesdroppers scenario, an AN-aided
secure beamforming scheme which jointly optimizes the
transmit beamforming vectors, power splitting (PS) ratio
and AN beamforming, is proposed. Since this optimiza-
tion problem is non-convex, it is conveniently trans-
formed into a convex form through the use of a epigraph
reformulation (ER), instead of using the two-dimensional
search [27] that requires high computational complexity.
• For the active eavesdroppers scenario, an orthogonal-
projection-based secure beamforming design scheme
which ensures the confidentiality of data transmission
is proposed. As this challenging optimization problem
is also non-convex, the NP-hard problem is reformu-
lated into a trackable convex problem. Furthermore, for
single antenna transmitters, the orthogonal-projection-
based beamforming design problem simplifies to a power
allocation problem which should not be solved via the
orthogonal projection based method. Instead, a power
control scheme is proposed through which via a trans-
formation of the objective function and constraints the
non-convex problem can be efficiently handled.
B. Related Previous Research
There has been recently a lot of interest from the
information-theoretic point of view, to exploit PLS techniques
in order to improve the security of wireless communication
systems [21], [23], [24]. For example, considering multiple-
input single-output channels (SISO), the cases of both direct
transmission and CJ with a helper have been investigated under
the assumption that CSI for the wiretap links is imperfect
[22]. For multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channels,
[25] proposed a CJ-aided SSR optimization scheme under
the assumption that the power of the system is sufficient.
Furthermore, [23], [26] have focused on studying the con-
fidential information transmission of relay systems with the
PLS techniques-aided. The secure transmission schemes in-
troduced in these two papers are based on the assumption that
available power of the considered relay systems is sufficient.
More recently in [21], a robust secure beamforming design
for MIMO two-way relaying system based on the AN and
physical layer network coding has been introduced. Various
performance evaluation results presented in [21] have shown
that such beamforming design will further improve the security
aspects of the two-way relaying system.
It is underlined that the above mentioned papers ( [21]–
[26]) investigate various PLS issues encountered in different
cooperative wireless communication systems without consid-
ering possible energy-limited constraints. Furthermore, these
papers have not investigated the security transmission problem
in connection with IoT type of wireless communication sys-
tems. On this topic, [1], [9], [14], different PLS-based secure
transmission schemes have been presented for IoT systems.
However these papers have not considered the energy-limited
feature of IoT systems when designing the secure transmission
beamforming.
To this end, it is necessary to solve the security problem
of the energy-constrained IoT systems with EH-assisted. In
this paper SWIPT is considered as an EH technique where
the IoT transmitter forwards information signal and AN via
the harvested energy only. Our work is different from above
works in the following aspects: i) [1] investigates the secure
transmission problem of IoT system, from an information-
theoretic point of view, and only the CJ technique is used
so that the coverage range of secure transmissions couldn’t
be guaranteed; ii) [9] considers a variety of eavesdropping
scenarios when designing the secure transmission protocols,
but colluding eavesdroppers cases are not explored; iii) [14]
considers a secure transmission for IoT under eavesdropper
collusion. Although the scheme proposed in [14] is more
general than that the schemes presented in [1] and [9], it has
not considered secure beamforming design nor the energy-
constrained problem. Note in our research here we not only
provide secure beamforming designs, but also the energy-
constrained problem is considered by combining the PLS
technique with SWIPT.
C. Notation and Organization: The remainder of this pa-
per is organized as follows: In Section II, we describe the
system model and problem formulation. In Section III, AN-
aided transmission beamforming design scheme is presented
when eavesdroppers’ CSI is unavailable. In Section IV, by
taking both the single-antenna and multiple-antenna scenarios
into account, two SSR optimization schemes are proposed
when the eavesdropper’s CSI is available. The performance
evaluation results and discussion are provided in Section IV.
The conclusions of the paper can be found in Section VI.
Boldface lowercase and uppercase letters denote vectors
3Table I
PARAMETERS AND THEIR MEANINGS
Ns Number of Antennas of the Controller
Ni Number of Antennas of the Di
Ne Number of Eavesdroppers
vi Transmit Beamforming Vector at Controller S
si Transmitted Symbol for Di
β Power Splitting Ratio
τ Transmission Time Fraction
w Transmit Beamforming Vector at D1
z Artificial Noise Vector
Ps Total Transmit Power at Controller
Pt Maximum Power Transmitted at D1
E Energy Harvested by D1
Ri Achievable Rate for Devices Di, i ∈ {1, 2}
Rsum Secrecy Sum Rate for the IoT System
γi Received SINR at Di
µ Mean of the Gaussian Noise Distribution
σ2 Noise Power
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Fig. 1. Model for the secure cooperative IoT based communication system
under consideration
and matrices, respectively. The Hermitian transpose, Frobenius
norm, and trace of the matrix A are denoted as AH , ‖A‖, and
Tr(A), respectively, whereas rank(A) and |A| stand for the
rank and the determinant of the matrix A, respectively. By
A  0 or A ≻ 0 , it is meant that the matrix A is positive
semidefinite or positive definite, respectively. IM is the identity
matrix of sizeM×M . CN×M denotes an N×M complex ma-
trix. diag (A) is a diagonal matrix with the entries of matrixA
as its diagonal entries. [·]+ , max {0, ·}. | · | and E {·} denote
the absolute value and the statistical expectation, respectively.
 represents the property of semidefinite. CN (µ, σ2) denotes
the circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with
mean µ and variance σ2. I (.; .) is the mutual information.
Additionally, a list of the most important system parameters
and their meaning can be found in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig. 1, an IoT downlink secure com-
munication system consisting of a controller, S, equipped
with Ns-antenna and two user devices, Di(i ∈ {1, 2})1
each equipped with Ni antennas is considered. S transmits
confidential information to the Di in the presence of Ne
colluding eavesdroppers, Eves2.
It is also assumed that D1, which operates under better
channel conditions, is used for receiving rather short control
signal data. D2, which operated under weak channel condi-
tions, which is a device which deals with some background
tasks, such as downloading multimedia files. As illustrated
in Fig. 1, the Eves G1e are located close to each other and
all of them are close to S. Clearly, such configuration will
lead to higher probabilities of interception for the transmitted
information signal.
To ensure the high targeted secrecy rate of D2, D1 acts as
an EH relay to forward the information-bearing signal to D2.
More specifically, the received signal at D1 is split into two
parts: one for energy harvesting and the other for information
decoding so that two stages will be involved in the cooperative
NOMA secure transmission. At D2 the two signals received
are combined by a maximal ratio combining (MRC) diversity
scheme. It is assumed that all the fading channels shown in
Fig. 1 are independent quasi-static fading channels, which
remain constant in one time slot but vary independently from
one time slot to another. Next the detailed operation of the
proposed communication system will be presented.
A. Direct Transmission Phase A: As illustrated in Fig. 1,
during the 1st stage of communication, S transmits over the
channels Hs1 and Hs2 the information signals s1 and s2
which, after beamforming, are received by D1 and D2 as
signals y
[A]
1 and y
[A]
2 , respectively. These beamformed signals
are also intercepted through the Gse channel by the Eves, as
y
[A]
e .
D1 performs EH by employing a SWIPT receiver in order to
perform the necessary PS. Noting that the received signals are
also corrupted by independent additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN), they can be mathematically expressed as:
y
[A]
1 =
√
(1− β)Hs1 (v1s1 + v2s2) + n(1)1 , (1a)
y
[A]
2 = Hs2 (v1s1 + v2s2) + n
(1)
2 , (1b)
y[A]e =Gse (v1s1 + v2s2) + n
(1)
e . (1c)
In (1), si is the transmitted information symbol for Di,
which has unity energy, i.e. E
{|si|2} = 1; vi ∈ CNs×1
is the transmit beamforming vector at S; Hsi ∈ CNi×Ns
and Gse ∈ CNe×Ns are the channel responses from S
to Di and Eves, respectively; β ∈ [0, 1] is the PS ratio;
n
(1)
i ∼ CN
(
0, σ2i INi
)
and n
(1)
e ∼ CN
(
0, σ2eINe
)
are the
additive white complex Gaussian noise vectors atDi and Eves,
respectively. For simplicity and without any loss of generality,
it is assumed that σ21 = σ
2
2 = σ
2
e = σ
2. Since the channel
conditions for both D1 and Eves are better than that of D2,
1From now on, and unless otherwise specified, the index i will always takes
values from the alphabet {1,2}.
2It is noted that, although the proposed system model considers only two
devices as a pair of users [28], this pairing can be generalized to multiple
users following the methodology we have proposed in [29]. However, this
extension is beyond the scope of our current research work and as such will
not be considered here.
4clearly ‖Hs2‖2 ≤ ‖Hs1‖2 , and ‖Hs2‖2 ≤ ‖Gse‖2 . The
received signals y
[A]
1 and y
[B]
2 are decoded by employing the
following SIC principles. ForD1, as it assumed that it operates
under good channel conditions, it will first detect the message
s2, which is intended for D2, and then eliminate it from the
combined signal. On the contrary,D2, as it operates under bad
channel conditions, it will not try to eliminate s1, which is
intended for D1, from the combined signal. Thus, from (1a),
the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) at
D1 for detecting s2 can be mathematically expressed as
SINR
[A]
1,s2
=
(1− β) ‖Hs1v2‖2
(1− β) ‖Hs1v1‖2 + σ2
, (2)
which should be larger than or equal to a predefined threshold
so that the QoS constraint at D1 can be satisfied. Then,for
the decoding of s1 at D, the corresponding received signal-
to-noise-ratio (SNR) is given by
SNR
[A]
1,s1
=
(1− β) ‖Hs1v1‖2
σ2
. (3)
From (1b), the SINR at D2 to detect s2 becomes
SINR
[A]
2,s2
=
‖Hs2v2‖2
‖Hs2v1‖2 + σ2
. (4)
Furthermore, the energy harvested by D1 can be formulated
as [30]
E = β
(
‖Hs1v1‖2 + ‖Hs1v2‖2
)
τ, (5)
where τ = 12 is the transmission time fraction for the first
phase, and the two phases have the same transmission duration.
It is assumed that the energy harvested by D1 is mainly used
for transmitting information and AN. Therefore, the maximum
power transmitted at D1 is given by [31]
Pt =
E
1− τ = β
(
‖Hs1v1‖2 + ‖Hs1v2‖2
)
. (6)
B. Cooperative Transmission Phase B: During the 2nd
phase of transmission, s2 is beamformed by w ∈ CN1×1 and
broadcast together with AN to D2 with the harvested energy.
Thus, the signal transmitted by D1 can be expressed as
x = ws2 + z, (7)
where z is the AN beamforming vector generated by D1,
whose distribution follows CN (0,Σ) with Σ  0. Then, the
observations at D2 and at the Eves can be expressed as
y
[B]
2 = H12x+ n
(2)
2 , (8a)
y[B]e = G1ex+ n
(2)
e , (8b)
respectively, where H12 ∈ CN2×N1 and G1e ∈ CNe×N1 are
the channel responses from D1 to D2 and to the Eves, respec-
tively. n
(2)
2 ∼ CN
(
0, σ2IN2
)
and n
(2)
e ∼ CN
(
0, σ2INe
)
are
the additive white complex Gaussian noise vectors at D2 and
Eves, respectively. Consequently, the SINR at D2 to detect s2
can be written as
SINR
[B]
2,s2
=
‖H12w‖2
‖H12z‖2 + σ2
. (9)
Thus, the combined SINR at D2 becomes
SINR2,s2 = SINR
[A]
2,s2
+ SINR
[B]
2,s2
. (10)
As previously noted, s2 is jointly detected at D2 from the
signals received from S and D1 by employing MRC diversity
reception.
From (1c) and (8b), the received signal of Eves for the two
phases can be given by
ye = Hes+ ne, (11)
where
ye =
[
y
[A]
e
y
[B]
e
]
, s =
[
s1
s2
]
, (12a)
He =
[
Gsev1 Gsev2
0Ne×1 G1ew
]
, (12b)
ne =
[
n
(1)
e
G1ez+ n
(2)
e
]
. (12c)
From (11), the information sum rate leaked to the Eves can
be written as [15]
Re = I (si;ye) =
1
2
log
∣∣INe +HeHHe Q−1e ∣∣ = 12log
1 +
Tr
(
Gse
(
2∑
i=1
viv
H
i
)
GHse +G1eww
HGH1e
)
Tr (Qe)

 ,
(13a)
where Qe = nen
H
e = diag
(
σ2INe , σ
2INe +G1eΣG
H
1e
)
,
i ∈ {1, 2} , and the factor 12 is introduced since the messages
are transmitted in two consecutive phases [32]. Note that
the minimum-mean-square-error criterion and SIC have been
employed by Eves. The achievable rates of D1 and D2 are
given by
R1 = I (s1;y1) =
1
2
log (1 + SNR1,s1) , (14a)
R2 = I (s2;y2) =
1
2
log (1 + SINR2,s2) , (14b)
respectively. As pointed out it [32], it is very difficult to obtain
the secrecy capacity region of the downlink wireless systems.
Alternative, the rate difference between the legitimate sum rate
and the information sum rate leaked to the Eves (i.e., Re) can
be computed as the secure performance measure. In this case,
the SSR can be expressed as [2]
Rsum =
[
2∑
i=1
Ri −Re
]+
. (15)
To improve the security of the downlink for the coop-
erative communication system under consideration, an SSR
maximization problem is formulated. The transmit power
constraint at S, the SIC constraint at D1 and the EH constraint
should be satisfied in the SSR maximization problem. The
EH constraint is that the achievable power for transmitting
information bearing signal and AN is smaller than or equal
to the energy harvested by D1. According to the result given
5in [7], a higher sum rate can be obtained if S allocates more
power for the information-bearing signal s1. However, such
an approach is not applicable in the optimization problem
consider here for which the user fairness and high targeted
secrecy rate at D2 should be ensured [7]. With the above in
mind, the optimization problem considered in this paper can
be formulated as
max
v1,v2
Rsum (16a)
s.t. SINR1,s2 ≥ γ, SINR2,s2 ≥ γ, (16b)
‖v1‖2 + ‖v2‖2 ≤ Ps, ‖w‖2 + ‖z‖2 ≤ Pt, (16c)
where Ps is the transmit power constraint at S, ‖w‖2 and
‖z‖2 are the allocated power for information transmission and
AN, respectively. Note that (16b) indicates that the received
SINR to decode s2 should be no less than the SINR threshold
γ, as (16b) relates to the SIC constraint at D1 to ensure the
necessary QoS decoding performance of D2.
Next the NP-hard problem of (16) will be solved by
optimizing v1,v2, w as well as β for the cases of passive
and active Eves (see Sections III and IV, respectively).
III. AN-AIDED SECURE BEAMFORMING DESIGN (ASBD)
FOR THE PASSIVE EAVESDROPPERS CASE
In this section, it is assumed that the passive Eves’ CSI
is not available at the transmitters D1 and S. For example
this occurs when the eavesdropping nodes in IoT systems are
passive or malicious. Since in this case even the location of
the Eves is hard to obtain [16], and thus obtaining CSI will be
even more difficult, a AN-aided beamforming design scheme
is proposed.
Zero-Forcing (ZF) Constraint on AN: Since D1 has no
CSI for the Eves, i.e., D1 doesn’t know G1e, in order to
eliminate the interference at D2, a ZF condition on the AN
beamforming is applied [21], [23]. In other words, the AN
beamforming is designed so that it steers the signal into the
null space of H12, so that H12z = 0. In this way, D1
cannot transmit AN to interfere the Eves selectively under the
Zero Forcing constraint [33]. Hence, the AN z is in the form
of z = H⊥n, where H⊥ = IN2 − H12
(
HH12H12
)−1
HH12
is the projection matrix onto the null space of H12. Note
that the components of n are independent and identically
distributed (iid) Gaussian variables, which follow CN (0, σ2z)
so that the spatial covariance of AN can be expressed as
Σ = σ2zH⊥H
H
⊥  0.
The SSR Rsum is maximized only when Re is minimized.
Thus, in order to minimize Re, the power allocated for AN
should be made as much as possible, under the EH and SIC
constraints at D1, the transmit power constraint at S and
QoS constraint at Di. According to the semidefinite relaxation
(SDR) technique, let Vi = viv
H
i , i ∈ {1, 2} ,W = wwH
and drop rank-one constraints rank (Vi) = 1, rank (W) = 1.
Thus, the secure beamforming problem is reformulated as
max
Vi0,W0, β
Tr (Σ) (17a)
s.t.
(
1 +
(1− β)Tr (W11)
σ2
)
≥ r1, (17b)(
1 +
Tr
(
W22
)
Tr (W12) + σ
2
+
Tr (W12)
σ2
)
≥ r2,
(17c)
(1− β)Tr (W21)
σ2 + (1− β) Tr (W11)
≥ γ, (17d)
Tr
(
W22
)
Tr (W12) + σ
2
+
Tr (W12)
σ2
≥ γ, (17e)
Tr (W) + Tr (Σ) ≤ βTr
(
2∑
i=1
Wi1
)
, (17f)
Tr (V1) + Tr (V2) ≤ Ps. (17g)
where Wi1 = Hs1ViH
H
s1, W
i
2 = Hs2ViH
H
s2, i ∈ {1, 2},
W12 = H12WH
H
12, ri is the predefined threshold of achiev-
able ergodic rate of Di, and
1
2 log(·) is not included in (17b)
and (17c) since the logarithmic function is a monotonically
increasing function. It is noted that the optimization problem
(17) is non-convex due to the non-convex constraints (17b)-
(17f). Consequently, these non-convex constraints will be
transformed into equivalent convex forms based on the idea
of SCA, which can be used to iteratively approximate a
non-convex optimization problems by an equivalent convex
problem [34].
Transformation of (17b): Based on the SCA method and the
ER, (17b) can be replaced by the following two constraints
θ21 ≥ (r1 − 1)σ2, (18a)[
(1 − β) θ1
θ1 Tr(W
1
1)
]
 0. (18b)
Lemma 1. For a standard convex function g(x) and a concave
function f(x), if the constraint g(x) ≤ f(x) exists, then the
constraint is convex [35].
Based upon the following Lemma, it is clear that (18a)
is non-convex. Therefore, the first order Taylor expansion
(FOTE) can be utilized to approximate (18a) with the fol-
lowing convex function
2θ
(n)
1 θ1 − (θ(n)1 )2 ≥ (r1 − 1)σ2, (19)
where θ
(n)
1 is the value of variable θ1 at the n-th iteration, i.e.
the superscript (n) denotes the point obtained during the n-th
iteration. Note that the constraint (17b) is now replaced by two
convex constraints, i.e., the linear matrix inequality constraint
(18b) and the convex constraint (19).
Transformation of (17c): Similarly, based on ER and FOTE,
the non-convex constraint (17c) can be approximated by the
6following convex functions
2ψ
(n)
1 ψ1 −
(
ψ
(n)
1
)2
≥ D + σ2 (r2 − 1) , (20a)[
Tr(W12)
σ2 ψ1
ψ1 Tr
(
W12
) ]  0, (20b)
where D = Tr
(
r2W
1
2 −W12 −W22 −W12
)
.
Transformation of (17d): The non-convex constraint (17d)
is equivalently formulated as
(1− β)Tr (W21 − γW11) ≥ γσ2. (21)
As (21) is still a non-convex constraint, ER and FOTE are
employed to yield the following approximate convex constraint
2φ
(n)
1 φ1 − (φ(n)1 )2 ≥ γσ2, (22a)[
(1− β) φ1
φ1 Tr
(
W21 − γW11
) ]  0. (22b)
Transformation of (17e): Similarly, the non-convex con-
straint (17e) is converted to the following convex form
2ω
(n)
1 ω1 − (ω(n)1 )2 ≥ Tr
(
γW12 −W12 −W22
)
+ σ2γ,
(23a)[
Tr(W12)
σ2 ω1
ω1 Tr
(
W12
) ]  0. (23b)
Transformation of (17f): In the same manner, the non-
convex constraint (17f) can be approximated by
2ϕ
(n)
1 ϕ1 − (ϕ(n)1 )2 ≥ Tr (W) + Tr (Σ) , (24a)
 β ϕ1
ϕ1 Tr
(
2∑
i=1
Wi1
)   0. (24b)
Thus, the optimization problem (17) has been recast as
max
Vi,W, β, θ1,
ψ1, φ1, ω1, ϕ1
Tr (Σ) (25a)
s.t. (17g), (18b), (19), (25b)
(20), (22)− (24), (25c)
Vi  0,W  0, i ∈ {1, 2} , (25d)
which is a semidefinite programming and its solution
(V∗1 ,V
∗
2 ,W
∗,Σ∗) can be obtained by off-the-shelf optimiza-
tion solvers, e.g., SeDuMi or Yalmip [36].
The convex problem (25) is solved in an iterative manner
starting with the initial values of
(
θ
(0)
1 , ψ
(0)
1 , φ
(0)
1 , ω
(0)
1 , ϕ
(0)
1
)
,
as presented in Algorithm 1. During each iteration,(
θ
(n)
1 , ψ
(n)
1 , φ
(n)
1 , ω
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
1
)
is updated based on the previ-
ously obtained solution until the SSR gap between two succes-
sive iterations is less than a predefined accuracy ǫ1. Moreover,
based on Lemma 3.1 of [37], the solution (V∗1 ,V
∗
2 ,W
∗)
yielded by SDR is rank-one. Then the beamforming vectors
v1,v2 and w are obtained by eigenvalue decomposition of
V1,V2 and W, respectively.
Finally, the information rate leaked to Eves can be shown
in (26) (in the top of the next page). Substituting (26) into
(15) and replacing (v1,v2,w) with (v
∗
1 ,v
∗
2 ,w
∗), the SSR of
the IoT system under consideration can be computed.
Algorithm 1 Proposed ASBD Scheme
1: Input: Set n = 0, θ
(0)
1 = 1, ψ
(0)
1 = 1, φ
(0)
1 = 1,
ω
(0)
1 = 1,ϕ
(0)
1 = 1, δ = 1, and ǫ1 = 10
−4.
2: while δ ≥ ǫ1 do
a) Solve (25) and update
(
θ
(n)
1 , ψ
(n)
1 , φ
(n)
1 , ω
(n)
1 , ϕ
(n)
1
)
←
(θ∗1 , ψ
∗
1 , φ
∗
1, ω
∗
1 , ϕ
∗
1),
b) Update β(n),V
(n)
i ,W
(n) and Σ(n).
c) Update δ =
∣∣∣Tr(Σ(n))− Tr(Σ(n−1))∣∣∣ .
d) Set n← n+ 1.
3: end while
4: Output: β∗,V∗i , W
∗ and Σ∗.
IV. SECURE BEAMFORMING DESIGN FOR THE ACTIVE
EAVESDROPPERS CASE
When active Eves are present, their CSI can be estimated
by S and D1 through leakage from the Eves’ receiver radio
frequency (RF) frontend [16]. Thus, the AN-aided transmis-
sion beamforming design proposed in Section III may not
be the best solution because of the presence of active Eves.
In light of this, an orthogonal-projection-based transmission
beamforming design is proposed for the SSR maximization
problem defined in (16). For this scheme it is noted that the
number of antennas at D1 should be more than that of the
Eves (i.e., N1 > Ne). For the case when S and Di have single
antennas, a simple power control scheme which optimizes the
SSR is also proposed.
A. Multi-Antennas Configuration
The main idea behind the new approach can be explained
as follows. Firstly, by using the available CSI of the Eves,
a new design for the transmit beamforming w is proposed,
which will deteriorate the quality of the signals received by
the Eves due to the addition of AN. This design will be termed
as Orthogonal-Projection-Based Secure Beamforming Design
(OSBD) for Multi-Antennas Case. On that basis, by letting
AN z = 0, the transmitted signal from D1 during the second
phase becomes
x = ws2. (27)
The observations at D2 and Eves can be expressed as
y
[B]
2 = H12ws2 + n
(2)
2 , (28a)
y[B]e =G1ews2 + n
(2)
e , (28b)
respectively, where w lies in the null space of Eves’ channel
G1e, i.e., G1ew = 0. Therefore, ww
H = α
(
IN1−Q1e
‖IN1−Q1e‖
)
and Q1e = G
H
1e(G
H
1eG1e)
−1G1e, where α ∈ [0, 1] is a scale
factor determining the power invested on transmit beamform-
ing. The received SINRs at D2 and Eves are given by
SINR2,s2 =
‖Hs2v2‖2
‖Hs2v1‖2 + σ2
+
‖H12w‖2
σ2
, (29a)
SINRe =
Tr
(
Gse
(
2∑
i=1
viv
H
i
)
GHse
)
Tr (Θ)
, (29b)
7Re =
1
2
log

1 +
Tr
(
Gse
(
2∑
i=1
v∗
i
v∗H
i
)
GHse +G1ew
∗w∗HGH1e
)
Tr
(
diag
(
σ2INe , σ
2INe +G1eΣ
∗GH1e
))

 . (26)
respectively, where Θ = diag
(
σ2INe , σ
2INe
)
.
To solve the optimization problem (16), we first let Vi =
viv
H
i , i ∈ {1, 2},W = wwH , and drop rank-one con-
straints rank (Vi) = 1, rank (W) = 1. Then, (16) can
be reformulated as (30) (on the top of next page), where
Wie = GseViG
H
se, and the non-constraints (17d) and (17e)
have been converted to convex forms as previously explained
in Section III. It is noted that (30) is non-convex due to the
non-convex objective function (30a) and the constraint (30b).
However, by using FOTE and ER, (30b) can be approximated
by the following convex constraint
2ϕ
(n)
2 ϕ2 − (ϕ(n)2 )2 ≥ Tr (W) , (31a)
 β ϕ2
ϕ2 Tr
(
2∑
i=1
Wi1
)   0. (31b)
Since problem (30) is still non-convex its objective function
will be transformed into the convex form based on the
SCA method. For this, by introducing the slack variables τ ,
µi ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, the objective function can be alternatively
reformulated as
max
τ, µi ≥ 0, β
2∑
i=1
µi − τ (32a)
s.t. log
(
1 +
(1− β) Tr (W11)
Tr (Θ)
)
≥ µ1, (32b)
log
(
1 +
Tr
(
W22
)
σ2 +Tr (W12)
+
Tr (W12)
σ2
)
≥ µ2,
(32c)
log

 Tr (Θ)
Tr
(
Θ+
2∑
i=1
Wie
)

 ≤ τ, (32d)
where factor 12 in (30) is omitted since it does not affect the
monotonicity of (30). Then, the SCA can be implemented over
(32). It can be seen that (32b) is equivalent to
(1− β) Tr (W11) ≥ (eµ1 − 1)Tr (Θ) , (33)
by the FOTE, (33) is transformed into
(1− β) Tr (W11) ≥ (x− 1)Tr (Θ) , (34)
where x = eµ
(n)
1 (µ1−µ(n)1 +1) is the FOTE of eµ1 around the
point µ
(n)
1 . According to the ER method, (34) is transformed
into the following convex form
2ξ(n)ξ − (ξ(n))2 ≥ (x− 1)Tr (Θ) , (35a)[
1− β ξ
ξ Tr
(
W11
) ]  0. (35b)
(32c) is non-convex and it is not suitable to handle the
non-convex problem by adopting the ER method. Therefore,
Proposition 1 is introduced to convert (32c) into a convex
form.
Proposition 1. For any non-negative variables x, y, z, a
non-convex expression xy ≤ z can be approximated by the
following convex constraint
(ηx) 2 + (y/η) 2 ≤ 2z. (36)
Proof: According to the arithmetic-geometric mean
(AGM) inequality, the approximation of the expression xy ≤ z
can be expressed as
2xy ≤ (ηx) 2 + (y/η) 2 ≤ 2z, (37)
where the former inequality holds with equality, if and only if,
η =
√
y/x. Then the non-convex expression xy ≤ z can be
replaced by
(ηx)2+(y/η)2
2 ≤ z. It can be observed that (ηx) 2+
(y/η) 2 ≤ 2z is a convex constraint based on Lemma 1, which
completes the proof.
Firstly, (32c) can be converted to(
eµ2 − Tr (W12)
σ2
)
Tr
(
W12
) ≤ Ξ, (38)
where Ξ = Tr
(
W22 +W12 +W
1
2
) − eµ2 + σ2. Using the
FOTE, (38) is then transformed into(
y − Tr (W12)
σ2
)
Tr
(
W12
) ≤ Ξ1, (39)
where Ξ1 = Tr
(
W22 +W12 +W
1
2
)−y+σ2 , y = eµ(n)2 (µ2−
µ
(n)
2 +1). Finally, according to the Proposition 1, (39) can be
approximated by the following constraint(
η(n)
(
y − Tr (W12)
σ2
))2
+
(
Tr
(
W12
)
/η(n)
)2
≤ 2Ξ1,
(40)
where η(n) can be updated by
η(n) =
√
(Tr (W12))
(n−1)
/
(
y − Tr (W12)
σ2
)(n−1)
. (41)
It is clear from Lemma 1 that now (40) is a convex constraint.
Employing FOTE and ER, we transform constraint (32d) as
follows
2φ
(n)
2 φ2 − (φ(n)2 )2 ≥ Tr (Θ) (1− z) , (42a)
 z φ2
φ2 Tr(
2∑
i=1
Wie)

  0, (42b)
8max
V10,V20,W0
1
2
log


(
1 +
(1− β)Tr (W11)
Tr (Θ)
)(
1 +
Tr
(
W22
)
σ2 +Tr (W12)
+
Tr (W12)
σ2
) Tr (Θ)
Tr
(
Θ+
2∑
i=1
Wie
)



 (30a)
s.t. Tr(W) ≤ Pt, (30b)
(17d), (17e), and (17g), (30c)
Algorithm 2 OSBD Scheme with Eves’ CSI
1: Input: Set n = 0, τ (0) = 1, µ
(0)
1 = 1, µ
(0)
2 = 0,
ϕ
(0)
2 = 1, φ
(0)
2 = 1, ξ
(0) = 1, ǫ = 10−4, and
R0 = µ
(0)
1 + µ
(0)
2 − τ (0).
2: Repeat
a) Solve (43) and obtain ϕ∗2, φ
∗
2, ξ
∗ as well as
the SSR, i.e., R = µ∗1 + µ
∗
2 − τ∗.
b) Update η(n) based on (41).
c) Update (τ (n), µ
(n)
1 , µ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
2 , φ
(n)
2 , ξ
(n))←
(τ∗, µ∗1, µ
∗
2, ϕ
∗
2, φ
∗
2, ξ
∗), R0 ← R.
d) Set n← n+ 1.
3: Until |R−R0|2 ≤ ǫ.
4: Output: β∗,V∗1 , V
∗
2 and W.
where z = eτ
(n)
(τ−τ (n)+1). At this point, constraint (32d) is
replaced by two convex constraints, i.e., the convex constraint
(42a) and the linear matrix inequality constraint (42b).
So far, the optimization problem (30) has been reformulated
as
max
ϕ2, τ, µi,
β, ξ, φ2
2∑
i=1
µi − τ (43a)
s.t. (17g), (22), (23), (31), (43b)
(35), (40), and (42), (43c)
Vi  0, µi ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2} . (43d)
Consequently, for the active Eves case, the original opti-
mization problem (16) has been transformed into the con-
vex form. Then the solution (V∗1 ,V
∗
2 ,W
∗) of (16) is ob-
tained by off-the-shelf optimization solver, e.g., SeDuMi
and Yalmip. The algorithmic implementation of the pro-
posed OSBD scheme is summarized in Algorithm 2. Note
that problem (43) is handled iteratively with the initial
value of (τ (0), µ
(0)
1 , µ
(0)
2 , ϕ
(0)
2 , φ
(0)
2 , ξ
(0)). For each iteration,
(τ (n), µ
(n)
1 , µ
(n)
2 , ϕ
(n)
2 , φ
(n)
2 , ξ
(n)) is updated with the solution
obtained in the previous iteration until the rate gap between
two successive iterations below the predefined accuracy. More-
over, the optimal solution (V∗1 ,V
∗
2,W
∗) yielded by SDR is
rank-one, which is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If problem (43) is feasible, the beamforming
vectors v1 , v2 and w can be exactly obtained by eigenvalue
decomposition of V∗1 ,V
∗
2 andW
∗, sinceV∗1 ,V
∗
2 andW
∗ are
rank-one.
Proof: The transmit beamforming vectors are jointly
optimized through the OSBD scheme. According to the rank
reduction procedure of the semidefinite programming given in
Lemma 3.1 of [37], V∗1 , V
∗
2 and W
∗ satisfy the following
inequality
rank2(V∗1) + rank
2(V∗2) + rank
2(W∗) ≤ 3. (44)
Since from (17d) and (32b) it is observed that problem (43)
is not feasible if V∗1 = 0 or V
∗
2 = 0, then, rank(V
∗
1) =
rank(V∗2) = 1, and also rank(W
∗) ≤ 1. Since α > 0,
rank(W∗) 6= 0, then clearly there exits a W∗ which satisfies
rank(W∗) = 1 and concludes the proof.
B. Single-Antenna Configuration
In applications where devices are equipped with a single
antenna, the secure beamforming design problem analyzed
in the previous subsection, simplifies to a power allocation
problem. As there will be no diversity gain and in order to
maximize the SSR and at the same time avoiding the AN
interference to D2, all the energy harvested by D1 is used for
information transmission. In other words, since the transmitted
signal from D1 during the second phase is represented as
x =
√
Pts2, the EH constraint from (16) can be removed.
Then, under the constraints of the transmit power at S and the
QoS requirement at Di, the SSR is optimized. By conveniently
introducing power allocation factors ρ1 and ρ2 as replacement
of the beamforming vectors v1 and v2, respectively, the
optimization problem is reformulated as
max
β,ρ1,ρ2
log (1 + Ps (1− β) h1)−
log
(
1 +
‖gse‖2 Ps + Psβh1 ‖g1e‖2
2σ2
)
(45a)
s.t. Ps (1− β)h1ρ1 ≥ γ1, (45b)
PHs (1− β)h1ρ2
1 + Ps (1− β)h1ρ1 ≥ γ2, (45c)
Psh2ρ2
1 + Psh2ρ1
+ Psβh12h1 ≥ γ2, (45d)
ρ1 + ρ2 = 1, ρ1, ρ2 ∈ [0, 1], (45e)
where h1, h2 and h12 are normalized main channel gains; gse
and g1e are wiretap channels; γi, is target SINR of Di; (45b)
and (45d) are QoS constraints of Di; And (45c) ensuring
that D1 can satisfactorily perform SIC. As this optimization
problem (45) is a bilevel programming problem, with the outer
level variable being β, it will be transformed into the convex
one.
9Following [6], it can be shown that at least one inequality
constraint in (45) is satisfied with equality at the optimal
solution when problem (45) is feasible. Otherwise, the op-
timization variables can be changed to increase the SSR until
one of the constraints holds with equality.
For convenience of the analysis’ presentation, let us consider
that the inequality constraint (45b) holds with equality at the
optimal solution so that
ρ1 =
γ1
Ps (1− β)h1 , ρ2 =
Ps (1− β)h1 − γ1
Ps (1− β)h1 . (46)
It is noted that the variables ρ1 and ρ2 are expressed as
a function of β. Substituting (46) into (45c) and (45d),
constraints (45c) and (45d) are rewritten as
Ps (1− β)h1 ≥ γ1 + γ2 + γ1γ2, (47a)
Psh
2
1h12β
2 ≤ ξ + ζ, (47b)
respectively, where ξ = Psh1h2 − γ2h1 − γ1γ2h2, ζ =
β
(
γ2h1 − Psh1h2 + Psh1h2h12γ1 + Psh21h12
)
. Since the
optimization, problem (45) due to is still non-convex, a slack
variable u is introduced to non-convex objective approximate
the second term in (45a) by FOTE. In this way, the non-convex
optimization problem (45) can be reformulated as
max
β,υ
log (1 + Ps (1− β) h1)− υ (48a)
s.t. 1 +
‖gse‖2 Ps + Psβh1 ‖g1e‖2
2σ2
≤ z, (48b)
(47a) and (47b), (48c)
where z = eυ
(n) (
υ − υ(n) + 1) . Since the optimization prob-
lem stated in (48) is now in convex form, its optimal solution
can be readily obtained by the handy solver, e.g., SeDuMi or
Yalmip. Note that if (45c) or (45d) hold with equality, a similar
methodology can be followed to obtain an equivalent convex
optimization problem. However, due to space limitations, the
detailed procedure will not be presented here.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
In this section, the SSR performance of the previously
described cooperative relay-aided secure IoT communication
systems will be presented. The various performance evaluation
results have been obtained by extensive computer simulation
experiments. It is assumed that the two legitimate users and
Ne eavesdroppers are deployed within a 8-meter×8-meter
network, while S is located at the edge with coordinate (0, 4).
hLi = 10
−3d−αii , (i = 1, 2) and hLe = 10
−3d−αee represent
the large-scale path losses, where di, (i = 1, 2) and de are the
distances from S to Di and Eves, respectively, α1 = 2, α2 = 4
and αe = 2 are the corresponding path loss exponents. The
downlink channels Hs1,H12,Gse and G1e operate in the
presence of Rician fading, as follows
H =
√
Γ
1 + Γ
HLoS +
√
1
1 + Γ
HNLoS, (49)
where HLoS is the LOS deterministic component, HNLoS
is modeled as the small-scale Rayleigh fading following
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Fig. 2. SSR versus the number of iteration for different N1s and r1s. (a)
γ = 3. (b) γ = 2.
CN (0, 1), and unless otherwise stated, with Rician factor
Γ = 4. The distribution of Hs2 follows CN (0, 1). Matlab
is used as a simulation tool, and Yalmip is employed as
an optimization solver. All the SSR curves are generated by
averaging 500 independent channel realizations.
A. Performance Evaluation of Proposed AN-aided Scheme
Without Eves’ CSI
Fig. 2 presents the SSR versus the number of iterations
for different N1 and r1, where the SINR threshold γ = 2, 3
in Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b), respectively. We set the number
of eavesdroppers, Ne = 3, the transmit power constraint
at S,Ps = 30 dBm. These performance evaluation results
clearly show that the proposed ASBD scheme converges to
a stationary point in few iterations. Furthermore, the SSR
performance improves as γ (i.e., the QoS requirement of D2)
decreases. This happens because the harvested power at D1 is
larger if γ become smaller, and then more power can be used
to transmit AN.
Fig. 3 presents the SSR performance of the ASBD scheme
versus the transmit power at S for different values of N1 by
fixing Ns = N2 = 4, Ne = 3 and γ = 3. For compar-
ison purposes, the performance of the secure beamforming
design scheme without AN-aided (denoted as “Without AN”)
has been also obtained. These results clearly show that the
SSR obtained by ASBD scheme is larger compared with the
benchmarks. Furthermore, it is observed that, with the increase
of N1, the SSR achieved by different schemes is improved
significantly.
Fig. 4 shows the SSR versus the predefined threshold of
achievable ergodic rate ofD1 for different values of Ns, where
Ps = 30 dBm, N1 = N2 = 4, γ = 3. It can be seen that
the SSR performance is enhanced as r1 increases, which is
consistent with previous findings presented in [7]. The reason
is that the transmitter S allocates more power to the strong user
D1 to satisfy the predefined threshold of achievable ergodic
rate of D1, which leads to the increasing of SSR. Meanwhile,
compared with the OMA-based secure beamforming design
with AN-aided (denoted as “OMA w/ AN”), the proposed
design exhibits better SSR performance when Ns increases.
B. SSR Comparison With Eves’ CSI
In Fig. 5, the convergence property of the proposed OSBD
algorithm and the algorithm given in [2] for the active Eves
10
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Transmit Power of Controller(dBm)
S
ec
re
cy
 s
u
m
 r
at
es
(b
it
s/
s/
H
z)
ASBD, N
1
=4
Without AN, N
1
=4
ASBD, N
1
=2
Without AN, N
1
=2
Fig. 3. SSR versus Ps, comparisons of the proposed ASBD scheme and the
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case is presented, with Ps = 30 dBm, γ = 3, Ne = 3, Ni =
4, Ns = {2, 4}. It is noted that, although the algorithm of [2]
also employs a NOMA transmission protocol and optimizes
the SSR of downlink systems, it only considers the direct
transmission link and does not use any physical layer security
technology. From Fig. 5, consensus has been reached that the
proposed algorithm converges to a stationary point in a fewer
steps than that in [2], especially for higher values of Ns.
To demonstrate the computational efficiency of the proposed
approach, we give the time needed for the two algorithms to
converge. Our proposed algorithm takes about 4.75 s for each
independent channel realizations, while the time required for
the algorithm given in [2] is about 7.11 s.
Fig. 6 illustrates the SSR performance of the proposed
OSBD scheme for the active Eves case. Set Ne = 3, Ni =
4, Ns = {2, 4}, γ = 3. We also consider the secure trans-
mission design given in [2], the NOMA secure transmission
protocol without relay-aided (denoted as “NOMA w/o EH”)
as well as the conventional OMA-based secure beamforming
design without relay-aided (denoted as “OMA w/o EH”)
as baseline algorithms. As expected, the proposed OSBD
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Fig. 5. The SSR performance versus the number of iteration for different
Nss.
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Fig. 6. The SSR performance of different schemes versus Ps.
scheme based on the cooperative secure transmission protocol
can obtain higher secrecy rate than that in [2]. In addition,
numerical results also indicate that the proposed scheme can
achieve much better SSR performance than the other two
benchmark schemes (i.e., NOMA w/o EH scheme and OMA
w/o EH scheme). With the fixed Ps, we can observe that, as
Ns grows, the SSR performance becomes better in different
schemes, since more array gains are provided.
Fig. 7 illustrates the SSR performance under different trans-
mit powers of controller for the single-antenna configuration.
Similar to Fig. 6, the three benchmarks are employed as
baseline algorithms, where N1 = N2 = Ns = 1, Ne =
3, γ1 = 2, γ2 = 3. Obviously, the SSR performance of the
proposed power control scheme outperforms that of the other
three benchmarks, especially in large transmit power region.
The reason is that the received signal at D2 is consisted of
two parts from the relay-assisted system so that the SSR of
the IoT is further enhanced.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the secure transmit beam-
forming design in the downlink IoT system. Taking diversified
QoS requirements of IoT users into account, a novel relay-
aided cooperative secure transmission strategy was proposed
to further improve the SSR of the IoT system. Two Eves
cases have been considered based on the availability of the
CSIs of Eves. For the passive Eves case, ASBD scheme was
proposed to jointly optimize the secure beamforming vectors,
AN covariance matrix as well as PS ratio. For the active multi-
antennas Eves case, OSBD scheme was proposed to maximize
the SSR of the considered IoT system. When the transmit-
ters (i.e., S and D1) are single-antenna configurations, the
orthogonal-projection-based optimization problem is degraded
into a power allocation problem and the optimal solution
can be found by fully exploiting the specific property of the
optimization problem. Various performance evaluation results
have demonstrated the superiority of the proposed schemes
compared to the existing benchmarks.
The proposed cooperative SWIPT secure transmission pro-
tocol can be applied to massively connected IoT systems in
the future, such as Healthcare IoT, in which a large quantity
of smart devices are involved in sensing health parameters
and these devices are confined by the limited power. For
Healthcare IoT applications, it is noted that security is a
vital yet challenging requirement during data collection from
patients to a centralized data collection center. Thus, as the
proposed secure transmission scheme is capable of ensuring
the security of Healthcare IoT, it could be very well used for
such kind of applications.
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